








Value disagreement and dual aspect semantics 
 
 
If two speakers disagree about an evaluative term like ‘torture’ in a sentence like 
‘Waterboarding is torture’, do they only talk past each other? On the basis of work by 
Plunkett & Sundell (P&S) (2011, 2013, 2014), I lay out why existing contextualist and 
relativist proposals, which were originally developed for predicates of personal taste, fail 
to explain such value disagreement, but also criticize their own metalinguistic negotiation 
view. According to P&S, speakers negotiate the bestuse of a notion on the basis of ‘... 
sociological facts about its sociological role’ (P&S 2013: p. 25), and the value 
disagreement can be substantial because there is something ‘... substantive at stake in 
how the relevant terms are used in the context [...] and the speakers recognize this fact.’ 
(ibid.) 
 
I argue that P&S are right in claiming that some of their own examples have a 
metalinguistic flavor, as they implicitly concern the question of what a given term eally 
means. However, it can be shown that speakers do not neg tiate the ‘best use’ of a term 
in value disputes and that despite their efforts P&S fail to argue convincingly that under 
the negotiation view the disagreement in question remains substantial. Instead, I propose 
a dual aspect theory of meaning that is based on a suggestion that Putnam (1975ab) made 
in the context of arguing for semantic externalism. Speakers agree about a truth-
conditionally incomplete core meaning, a stereotype in Putnam’s parlance, of a value 
term while disagreeing about the noumenal meaning or what it really means. I show that 
once it is elaborated, such a dual aspect theory of meaning can solve the puzzles raised 
by (supposedly) metalinguistic negotiation examples and that the same type of 
disagreement also occurs with other theoretical general terms like ‘atom’. 
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